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Discussion: Comments on J. Holt, Requirements of Justice and
Liberal Socialism
Alan Thomas*
The Demands of Democratic Ownership
https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2017-0023
Abstract:This paper considers an argument that justice as fairness requires liberal
socialism as opposed to a property-owning democracy. It analyses the arguments
for departing fromRawls’s principled agnosticism over the choice between liberal
market socialism and property owning democracy. It questions the extension of
Rawls’s fair value guarantee for the political liberties to all liberty and suggests an
alternative interpretation of the kind of predistributive egalitarianism represented
by a property-owning democracy.
Keywords: Socialism, property-owning democracy, liberalism, John Rawls
Rawls claimed that justice is realised by either liberal socialism (henceforth ‘LS’)
or a property-owning democracy (henceforth, a ‘POD’). Justin P. Holt, likeWilliam
Edmundson, thinks that Rawls’s agnosticism on this point was misguided (Holt
2017; Edmundson 2017). Justice as fairness requires LS: public “control” over the
means of production “is an essential feature of a fair and well-ordered society”
(Holt 2017, 193, emphasis added).
This is clearly a departure from Rawls’s views; the question is its motivation.
For Holt, democratic citizenship expresses a value of mutual reasonableness that
requires nothing less than the public ownership of themeans of production.With-
out this privileged locus of social interactions citizens are “less reasonable [. . . ]
due to the lack of the institution of public ownership to act as a mechanism to ex-
press the reasonable structuring of people’s interests” (Holt 2017, 192). Themarket
must be subordinated to democratic control in this specific way.
As Holt (and Edmundson) note, Rawls justified private property as essential
to the expression of the two moral powers, but he also believed that this did not
settle the question of who owns the means of production. He at least envisaged a
private property society where people could act in a way that reflected a reason-
able joint commitment to reciprocity; Holt disagrees. Summarily, my concern is
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that this grounds his view on a controversial conception of the good that is incon-
sistent with political liberalism.
This emerges clearly in Holt’s extension of Rawls’s fair value guarantee for
the political liberties alone to the ‘equal worth’ of all liberty. The motivation for
this departure from RawlsÐone that is clearly going to produce a more stringent
egalitarianismÐis not clear, but I surmise that joint self-realisation requires noth-
ing less. So not placing the means of production under public control would be
łcontrary to the equal worth of libertyž (Holt 2017, 185). That may well be true on
Holt’s conception, but he does not explain what justiőes this extension of the fair
value guarantee.
If there is lurking inconsistency in Holt’s view, it is in his agreement with
Rawls that there might be a sphere of what Edmundson calls ‘petty production’
constituted by private őrms (Edmundson, 2017, 39).¹ Holt agrees with Rawls that
the diference between a socialist and private property economy is one of degree,
but I őnd it hard to envisage how tolerating an extensive sphere of proőt-seeking
petty production is compatible with the connection Holt envisages between pub-
lic ownership and the reasonable co-ordination of citizens’ claims via a shared
structure of public ownership.
I concede to HoltÐand to EdmundsonÐthat a proponent of a POD has to ad-
dress Rawls’s surprising remark that a POD may be vulnerable to Marx’s charge
that private ownership, per se, is the root of the problems faced by liberal consti-
tutional democracies (Rawls 2001, 178). A POD may generate, in Rawls’s words,
‘political and economic forces’ that lead to the actuality departing from the ideal
in an unacceptable way. Rawls’s scepticism is discouraging, but it is worth bear-
ing in mind another criticism of the view: that while there have been local exper-
iments in workplace democracy, or state wide commitment to welfare state cap-
italism, there has never been a POD. This point is often made critically; but one
might as well reply that when Rawls speculates that such an ideal would fail in
actualityÐhe is, indeed, speculating.
Consider the sentence: ‘őre alarms must be őtted on each ŕoor, but espe-
cially if smoking is permitted’; if a vulnerability is identiőed, then it must be mit-
igated. By analogy, if private ownership of the means of production is permit-
ted, this requires safeguards. Rawls seems to have overlooked that if the main
threat to democracy from permitting private ownership of the means of produc-
tion is the concentration of capital ownership, then the whole point of a POD is
pre-emptively to neutralise this threat by breaking up excessive concentrations of
capital. When Holt notes that Rawls’s ‘explicit recommendations’ to address the
1 Contrast the discussions on pages 186 and 192 of Holt 2017.
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threat posed to democracy by concentrate capital involve an ‘insulation strategy’
to keep money out of politics he is being misled by Rawls. Rawls ought to have
said that it is a POD that pre-emptively undermines these threats in the őrst place
(Thomas 2017, ch. 4). That was his ‘fair value’ guarantee for political libertyÐnot
all liberty.
Holt’s point-by-point comparison of LS and POD ismarred by hismis-charact-
erisation the latter. He does not regard as signiőcant Rawls’s predistributive focus
on equalising agents’ endowments prior to their market transactions; Holt calls
Rawls an ‘interventionist’ and the mechanisms of a POD ‘redistributive’. In my
view, the aim of a POD is to prevent excessive concentrations of capital, not (as
Holt argues) to eliminate them entirely. People can save and make productive use
of capitalÐsubject to the demands of fair reciprocityÐin a POD. Rawls’s preferred
system of inheritance also seeks widely to disseminate capital holding whereas
Holt claims it eliminates the bequest of wealth entirely.
A property-owning democracy strengthens each agent’s right of exit and
thereby strengthens their democratic voice. In this way a POD seeks to make
worker managed őrms not a privileged locus of democratic expressionÐhence
mandatory onHolt’s viewÐbut a formof association that increasingly autonomous
workers will seek out, moving such őrms from the periphery to the centre of our
economies in just the way that Mill envisaged. But they need not be viewed as
a privileged site for the expression of democratic values. Signiőcant workplace
autonomy is one value to be balanced against others; of course, this łdemocratic
deőcitž must be paid of somewhere. But one need not assume the truth of Joshua
Cohen’s version of the requirement that workplaces are microcosmic social forms
that must be congruent with the macrocosmic social form of a democratic society
as a whole (Thomas 2017, ch. 9).
Rawls sought to eliminate a capitalist classwho enjoy a structurally grounded
power to dictate the terms of labour to other citizens through their monopoly con-
trol of the means of production. His simple expedient is to make every citizen a
capitalist; a separate capitalist class no longer exists in either a POD or in LS. Holt
is certainly right that Rawls took Marx’s critique of capitalism seriously, but we
disagree that Rawls should simply have agreed with Marx that łliberalism cannot
maintain the formal equality of citizenship with the actual inequality of actual
citizens, at least theoreticallyž (Holt 2017, 193). So I am not convinced that Holt
has demonstrated that LS is the only way to express the value of justice as fair
reciprocity.
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